Russian Pain-Train Enters Ukraine; Or, LOL! What is this!? WW2? š¤£
TLDR: Neither, it's about logistics.
I was wondering if any of the refurbished armored trains would be sent to Ukraine; especially considering one that participated in military exercises in 2015 has been parked in Crimea this whole time, and Russian forces are reportedly facing serious logistical challenges as they push deeper into Ukraine. Now that one of the trains has reportedly been spotted near Melitopol in southern Ukraine, analysts, pundits, and arm-chair generals alike are clamoring and arguing over the actual combat effectiveness of such a vehicle, and what the Russians might be thinking in deploying it.
First, I want to address a rumor going around that this train is part of Russiaās āBarguzin Projectā and carrying ICBMs with thermonuclear warheads. It isnāt. A Barguzin isnāt a train, itās a launch-system contained in a freight-car that can be moved around by almost any train (see below). The whole concept of Barguzin is that the transportation and launch-platforms are indistinguishable from a standard Russian freight car until put into launch configuration. The entire launch-system for Barguzin, including 6 ICBMs, is entirely contained within a standard-looking freight-car, and can easily be hidden and distributed anywhere along Russiaās vast railway network.
This āgray manā approach to Barguzinās design makes it nearly impossible to reliably target and eliminate them in a first-strike or limited nuclear engagement scenario; thus providing Russia with a reliable nuclear response capability and theoretically ensuring MAD as a deterrence to such aggression. Bringing a Barguzin into an active conflict zone would be counter to the doctrine that created them, and introduce the risk of destruction or capture, as well as present adversaries and rivals with an opportunity to gather more intelligence on the system and potentially uncover methods of distinguishing them from standard freight-cars. It would be an altogether a bad plan to deploy a Barguzin to Ukraine, especially now when Russia is partially relying on itās nuclear response capability to deter direct military intervention by NATO in Ukraine.
The train seen near Melitopol (show below) is a, or contains parts of several parts of, refurbished armored-trains from the Soviet-Era (reportedly āBaikalā and āAmurā), of which Russia still has several in service. It is basically a rolling barracks replete with chow-hall, communications and electronic-warfare capabilities, massive cargo capacity, and AA guns. Notably, it is not very good at blending in with other ānormalā trains, and thus would defeat the primary purpose of Barguzin. Also, as can be seen in the videos and pictures on social media that are reportedly of it in southern Ukraine near Melitopol, it is not hauling any standard Russian freight-cars; so it canāt have a Barguzin. This is, while somewhat uncommon in modern times, just a āconventionalā armored-train like the many others before it.
While there are not many modern instances of the use of such an armored train, and thus not a whole lot of precedence to work with, such trains did see limited use by Russia in conflicts in Chechnya and Georgia, so it is not unheard of. However, the Ukrainians have a somewhat more modernized military and are being resupplied with top-of-the-line military hardware and software from countries around the world. Which begs the question, does this behemoth from a seemingly bygone era have a place in modern warfare, or have the Russians completely lost the plot and/or are underestimating the capabilities of Ukrainian forces?
Letās start with the most obvious weakness, and the primary reason for the ridicule from pundits. Even though it is a vehicle, and thus mobile, it still has a major mobility issue due to, well, being a train; trains only run on tracks, and everyone already knows where the tracks are. On a modern battlefield with highly-portable anti-armor weapons in ready supply, the trains restriction to a set number of highly predictable routes leads many to point out that it is going to be way too easily tracked and effectively ambushed to be of any significant combat benefit to the Russians. Which is a valid point. Ostensibly, modern military forces are both much more mobile and potently armed then the era of war these trains were primarily made for and used in, so it will have to contend with threats that such trains in the past did not; and with little or no tactical doctrine of operation proven out on a modern battlefield to mitigate such risks.
The very credible threats in Ukraine to a large, lumbering, easily tracked Russian vehicle include things like; highly mobile mechanized or light infantry equipped with a variety of modern mounted, crew-served, and individually deployed anti-armor weapons that have proven effective against modern armored targets including main battle tanks; fixed or rotary-wing aircraft using guided munitions from distances or altitudes that are beyond the range of the train's limited AA capabilities; and armed drones like the TB2 Bayraktar that the Ukrainian forces have already been using to effectively strike Russian supply convoys, which can be very hard to detect and engage even with more modern sensors and targeting systems that the train doesnāt seem to have (see vid below). So, with all those threats and little in the way of proven mitigating use doctrine, what are those ācrazyā Russians thinking? The answer is: Theyāre thinking logistics.
As has been expressed in many different ways by numerous military leaders; Inexperienced high-ranking military leaders focus too much time and attention on devising innovative tactics and/or strategies to use in combat, while seasoned high-ranking leaders know itās more important to ensure logistical sustainability of operations while allowing their trusted ground commanders to conduct combat operations and base their tactics and strategies off of conditions on the ground and lessons-learned in the operating environment; listening, advising, and supporting operations based on situational demands rather then dictating grand-theories from a bunker and demanding results. The Russians rely heavily on railways for logistical support and resupply of their forces, and NATO even acknowledges that Russia's ability to rapidly reconfigure their force-posture along their boarders via rail is a valuable tactical and strategic asset that affords them the ability to react with incredible speed to changes in the threat environment.
So, while such armored trains have been and can be used in both direct offensive and defensive roles, that is not actually the primary "force-multiplying" capability that it brings to the field. It may be armed, armored, and imposing looking, but it isnāt primarily a combat vehicle. What many of the people trying to understand the reason for deploying this train are overlooking is that it has very little to do with it's offensive and defensive capabilities, and everything to do with being able to rapidly repair damaged or destroyed sections of track (and potentially even bridges), and acting as a command and control element to organize logistical operations.
Such an armored train can carry enough materials, equipment, and manpower to rapidly fix damaged sections of track (reportedly up to 150 meters at a time), and has the on-board communications and other technologies to coordinate and direct rail traffic moving to and from the front; keeping valuable supply lines open and moving smoothly. These primary capabilities and intended use was also previously acknowledged by an āofficialā from the Russian Defense Ministry in 2015 when footage of the armored train āBaikalā participating in military exercises went viral (https://tass.com/russia/813122).
If I had to make a serious assessment of the significance of the deployment of this train, I would advocate that it is likely indicative of one of two things. On one hand, the deployment of the train could be part of the original invasion plan and will likely be used to open and maintain sections of track for logistical support operations conducted by a fleet of more conventional trains moving in through Crimea from Russia. In fact, trains with "Z"s carrying similarly marked civilian style vehicles have recently been reported in Russia (seen below); these vehicles could be for use in track repair and maintenance, as well as for conducting rear-echelon logistical support where more armored and expensive vehicles are less necessary.
In that case, the armored train was likely held back until Russian forces had gained enough control of the rail system, ground, and skies in southern Ukraine for it to begin operating and more safely move in the rear-echelon elements; as these will be vital in ensuring that logistical support to the combat forces remains sufficient as they move farther away from current supply points. Which, to this point, has reportedly been a struggle for Russian forces via road due to both poor weather and effective hostile actions by Ukrainian forces. Which leads into the second potential meaning of the train's arrival. It could signal the activation of a contingency plan to ensure logistical support in the event that the primary method (via convoys) begins to break down or has failed (which has been suggested by analysts).
However, if that were the case, one could speculate as to why it is in the south when it is the forces in the north that are reportedly experiencing the worst supply issues. If the purpose of the train is to ensure logistical support in the face of primary resupply plan failure, then it wasnāt deployed very optimally, because it canāt offer any support to the troops that need it most from itās current location. Considering how easily and quickly it could have used the highly developed railway network along the Russian boarder to restage and enter from a more northern route, I find it hard to believe itās not where it is because thatās where Russia planned for it to be in the first place. If that is true, then the arrival of the train now could signal that the Russians may be shifting the focus of major operations to the south as the northern offensive is struggling with supply issues.
The Russians may have determined it is easier to just focus on continuing with their original plan on the southern front for the time being, rather then have southern forces wait while they try to fix the logistical issues on the northern front. We may see the northern forces largely halt their advances, fortify forward positions to maintain gains, and then re-organize and re-consolidate forces in preparation for future operations while they sort out all the logistical issues that stalled them. Meanwhile, with northern forces focusing on defensive operations and fortifying control over gained territory, and thus needing less support from higher-level offensive assets, southern forces could engage in a heavily supported offensive to gain ground. Doing so would provide a much larger safe stand-off distance between front-line combat and rear-echelon logistical support operations, as well as allow them to develop a more fortified beachhead with better support capabilities so forward elements can continue their advance northward despite the northern force having failed to take Kyiv and other vital military and command and control targets in the north.
Also, regardless of which is true, we may see other such trains make their way into Ukraine if Russian forces are either able to advance far enough, or unable to ensure logistical support via other means. In either case, analysts and pundits should spend less time ridiculing the train as antiquated, and assuming the Russian's are fielding an obsolete vehicle because they are either poor, desperate, or dumb, and instead spend more time trying to understand the capabilities that it brings to the field and how the Russians might plan to leverage those capabilities.